1. Technological Field
The present application relates generally to telecommunications and, in particular, to a method for tearing down in progress special service calls which have been validated and authorized, but have been subsequently found to be fraudulent.
2. Description of the Related Art
The telecommunications industry has experienced significant changes in the way that customers are billed for their telephone calls. From the once simple method of billing the originating caller, many methods have been developed, allowing greater flexibility for the telecommunications customer. A predominant method for making telephone calls away from home or the office is by utilizing the telephone calling card to charge the call.
Calling card customers may use any telephone facility, including public facilities, to make a call that will be charged to their account. The process of making calls using a calling card typically includes dialing an xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d number, waiting for an audio prompt, and then entering an account number and a Personal Identification Number (PIN) into a telephone key pad device. The xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d (and now xe2x80x9c888xe2x80x9d) number phone calls are one type of a category of phone calls called xe2x80x9cspecial servicexe2x80x9d calls. These special service calls, which include xe2x80x9c700xe2x80x9d, xe2x80x9c800/888xe2x80x9d, and xe2x80x9c900xe2x80x9d number calls, allow contemporary telecommunications networks to provide many services beyond direct distance dialing. It is the long distance carriers that provide this special service call processing, which allows for toll-free calls, calling card calls, special rate calls, etc.
Following the example of a calling card call, once the account number and PIN have been entered, the calling card customer can make one or more calls from whatever location the customer is dialing in from. These calls are subsequently charged to the customer""s calling card account. Calling cards can also be used to avoid having to pay additional surcharges when making calls from certain public facilities such as hotels and telephone booths.
As with many new technologies, the ease and flexibility of the use of calling cards has led to abuse, and has consequently brought about new types of fraud. Calling card fraud costs businesses (and consumers) millions of dollars annually. Current security mechanisms, while effective, are not fail-safe, and protection mechanisms for consumers and businesses require improvement to stem these fraud-related losses.
There is a virtual underground industry in stolen calling cards and authorization codes. The multitude of ways that calling cards and authorization numbers find their way into unscrupulous hands need not be discussed here, but suffice it to say there is no end to the ingenuity of the criminal mind. One example of calling card fraud is the technique of xe2x80x9csurfingxe2x80x9d banks of public telephones, such as are at airports. Criminals xe2x80x9csurfxe2x80x9d by looking over the shoulders of legitimate card users as they key in the account number and PIN. Then they sell or distribute these numbers and rampant fraud results. In some cases, a single account may incur charges in excess of $100,000 in a single weekend. Calling card fraud and other forms of fraudulent use present pervasive problems for telephone carriers, particularly long distance carriers.
One method of fraud control is to simply remove calling card numbers against which it is suspected that fraudulent calls are being charged. In order to recognize fraudulent calls, a xe2x80x9cbilling numberxe2x80x9dxe2x80x94a billing product and an account number, such as a calling card, pre-paid phone card, etc.xe2x80x94is monitored over time. For example, where the number of domestic calls placed within a certain amount of time using the same billing number exceeds a certain threshold, an alert is generated. International calls may have a lower threshold so that fewer calls within the time period generate an alert. In addition, the threshold may be further adjusted for calls to countries where a high percentage of fraudulent calls are directed.
When a threshold alert is generated, it is typically sent to a fraud analyst. A fraud analyst would be stationed at a fraud control console 158, as shown in FIG. 1. The fraud analyst analyzes the alert and the history of that billing number in order to determine whether or not to deactivate that billing number. The fraud analyst may attempt to contact the calling card user in order to resolve the issue. If the fraud analyst decides that the calling card is being used fraudulently, he sets a xe2x80x9cfraud flagxe2x80x9d which indicates that subsequent calls using this billing number should be blocked or intercepted. When the fraud flag is set, the billing number is flagged in the Billing Number Screening (BNS) server 160 in FIG. 1. This whole process may be automated so that a fraud analyst is not needed to actually flag a billing number. Because of this, the term xe2x80x9cfraud control consolexe2x80x9d or xe2x80x9cfraud controlxe2x80x9d will be used herein to signify either a console operated by a fraud analyst or an automated process.
An example of a conventional calling card call is shown with reference to FIG. 1. The caller, using telephone 111, makes a calling card call by dialing a number in the format of 1-800-NXX-XXXX. The call is routed through Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) 110. LEC refers to local telephone companies, such as the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), which provide local transmission services for their customers. Because of the 1-800 format of the dialed number, the routers in the LEC will forward the call to the network of the appropriate long distance carrier (or Inter-Exchange Carrier IXC) 100. Special service telephone calls, such as xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d number calls, are provided by IXCs, such as MCI-Worldcom. After switching through LEC switches 112 and 114, the xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d number is routed into the IXC 100 to a bridge switch 102. The purpose of the bridge switch 102 is to receive calls from the IXC network and bridge them to the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) 106 and, ultimately, into the Intelligent Services Network platform (ISN) 150. There are a number of ISNs within the IXC, but, for the purpose of understanding the present invention, one ISN will suffice.
The ACD 106 is under the direct control of the Application Processor APP 156, which is a general purpose computer that functions as the central point for call routing control in the ISN 150. When the xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d number call arrives at the ACD 106, the ACD 106 makes a request to the APP 156 for directions as to how the call should be handled. Such a request would usually be accompanied by information concerning the call; i.e. the Automatic Number Identification (ANI) of the caller and the destination number of the call. The APP 156 would recognize by the xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d prefix of the destination number that the call is a special services call and, consequently, the APP 156 would instruct the ACD 106 to deliver the call to the appropriate queue. In this case, assuming that the call is to a calling card xe2x80x9c800xe2x80x9d number, the call would queue up to the Automatic Response Unit (ARU) 152. The ARU 152 comprises two components, one to process the call, the other to prompt the caller with a voice response system. It is the ARU 152 that will ask the caller for the required final destination number, calling card number, and PIN. When a live operator is required, the call is routed to the Manual Telecommunications Operator Console (MTOC) 154. Whether the call is routed to the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154, the same informational decisions will have to be made. In other words, regardless of whether it is entered by the operator at the MTOC 154 or by the caller at her telephone 111 to the ARU 152, the calling card account number will have to be entered.
During the course of servicing a call, the need often arises to xe2x80x9cparkxe2x80x9d a call on the ACD 106. When a call is parked on the ACD 106, the call is active, i.e., there is a party on the call with an established voice channel connected to the ACD 106. The call is monitored and maintained at the ACD. Once a call is parked at the ACD, it is no longer under direct control of either the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154 that parked the call. This allows the facilities at the ISN 150 to be freed up to perform other tasks or services. A Call Park Server (CPS) 170 monitors calls parked on the ACD 106 by maintaining a relational database. Information concerning the status of calls parked on the ACD 106 is sent to the CPS 170.
When the caller enters her account number and PIN, the ISN 150 checks the billing number associated with that account in the BNS 160. If the billing number is flagged, the call may be re-routed to an MTOC 154, a fraud analyst at a fraud console 158, or simply disconnected. If the billing number is not flagged in the BNS 160, the call processing will continue. For example, if the destination number was outside the country, various databases, such as an Exchange Master database (X-MASTER) 162, an International Country Code database (INTERNAT""L COUNTRY) 164, an International City Code database (INTERNAT""L CITY) 166, would be referred to in order to effectively route and bill the call. Once the call processing is complete, and the call has been completely authorized and validated, the connection is released back to the bridging switch 102 and the switching elements of the IXC 100. The call exits the IXC network 100 and enters LEC 190, where it is switched through LEC switches 192 and 194 before connecting with telephone unit 199.
This method is effective in eliminating fraudulent calls made by calling cards that have already been recognized as fraudulent. However, this conventional method is ineffective in stopping calls that are already in progress. This is because, after a call has been authorized and validated, its connections are released to the automated switching of the IXC 100, where they can not be retraced. Thus, when a fraud console 158 flags a billing number in the BNS 160, the calls associated with that billing number that are already in progress are unaffected, because the connections cannot be easily traced in the automated switching of the IXC 100. Although future calls will be effectively blocked, all in-progress calls will continue unaffected.
Although the costs associated with in-progress fraudulent calls may seem a minor problem, they are not. Many fraudulent calls, particularly ones to international numbers, last for many hours. As an example of the costs involved, let""s suppose an IXC loses an estimated $33 million to calling card fraud. For international fraudulent calls, the IXC incurs actual LEC expenses for the fraudulent calls, not merely lost revenues. So, out of the $33 million, let us further suppose an estimated 38%, or $12 million, is out of pocket expenses. If just the in-progress international fraudulent calls were eliminated, at least 10% of that $12 million, or $1.2 million, would be saved.
Therefore, there is a need to eliminate in-progress fraudulent calls, or, more precisely, calls that were previously authorized and validated, but whose billing numbers have been subsequently flagged.
One object of this invention is to provide a system and method of blocking in-progress fraudulent calls in a telecommunications system.
Another object of this invention is to provide a system and a method for intercepting in-progress fraudulent calls at an ISN in a telecommunications system.
An additional object of the present invention is to temporarily park suspected calls at an ISN, so that, if the billing number for one of the suspected calls is flagged, the in-progress fraudulent call may be torn down.
To accomplish the above and other objects, a system and method for interrupting calls at the ISN is provided which uses established criteria to determine which calls are suspect, monitors calls being processed at an ISN to determine which are suspect, and parks suspect calls at the ACD. Records concerning the suspect calls parked at the ACD and containing the billing numbers associated with the suspect calls are kept at the CPS. Although other means for selecting a suspect call may be used, the preferred embodiment uses Call Park Flags in the International Country Code Database, the International City Code Database, and the Exchange Master Database to select which calls are suspect. The suspect calls do not remain parked at the ACD indefinitely, but are released to the network after a predetermined amount of time. The predetermined amount of time varies according to the category and type of call.
When a billing number is flagged as fraudulent at the BNS, a teardown request is generated. The billing number in the teardown request is compared with the billing numbers in the records of the CPS. If there is a match, the ACD is directed to tear down any calls associated with the CPS record.